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Sara Aguirre-Sánchez-Beato, Caroline Closon and Isabelle Rorive1  
 
Abstract 
Belgium has recently modified the way ‘sex’ is legally certified for trans* people 
following the principle of self-determination. However, like in most countries, this 
modification has not changed the way ‘sex’ is determined for all members of society, 
being limited to trans* people. How is sex legally certified for different categories of 
people in Belgium and what are the effects thereof? Drawing on the theoretical 
perspective of discursive psychology (DP), we consider sex/gender categories as 
something constructed in discourse – in this case, legislative discourse – and not as 
an essentialist and pre-discursive reality. Categories are thus an effect of discourse: 
what discourse accomplishes or constructs. Based on this premise, this paper aims at 
elucidating the ideological effects and practical implications of the legal certification 
of sex in Belgium. The effects of the legislative discourse are ideological in the sense 
that they establish social norms, in this case, regarding sex/gender, leading to 
practical implications in everyday life. To elucidate these effects, we first identified 
Belgian civil law on the legal certification of sex since the establishment of Belgium 
as a sovereign state. We then applied a DP-inspired analytical device comprising a 
qualitative content analysis and the examination of content variability. The 
variability of discourse is a key analytical tool to elucidate the effects of discourse 
since these are not directly observable. The results show that the analysed legislation 
constructs women and men as natural categories. This is carried out through: 1) the 
establishment of a distinction between the population at large (unmarked) and those 
‘outside the norm’ (marked subjects: ‘transgender’, ‘intersex’); 2) the lack of legal 
regulation of the attribution of sex markers at birth, being taken for granted; 3) the 
regulation of the latter only in ‘abnormal cases’ (called ‘children suffering from 
sexual ambiguity’); and 4) the fact that gender identity is recognised as a criterion for 
the attribution of sex markers only for trans* people, presented as an exception to the 
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norm. This variability reifies sexual dimorphism and naturalises the correspondence 
between ‘biological sex’ and gender identity, thereby constituting ‘normative’ and 
‘deviant’ sex/gender categories. The results are discussed in light of the practical 
implications that this legal norm has in everyday life. 
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The classification of human beings into the categories of women and men is not only 
an everyday social practice but is also established in law. In most, if not all, national 
jurisdictions, every individual is assigned a sex3 at birth. This is usually indicated in 
their identity documents by dichotomous4 sex markers, i.e. markers allowing for 
only two sexes5. Every time we show our identity documents, the reader sees the 
binary category (female/male) we were assigned at birth. 
 
This visibility is problematic for those not identifying with the legal sex 
assigned at birth, such as trans* people,6 especially when their physical appearance 
does not ‘match it’. Since identity documents serve the function of attesting who the 
individual is, the mismatch leads to various issues such as not being allowed to 
board a bus or to cross international borders (Bender-Baird, 2011), to pick up a parcel 
or to open a bank account (Bribosia and Rorive, 2018). Moreover, the visibility of the 
mismatch between their physical appearance and their legal sex forces them to ‘come 
out as trans*’, putting them at risk of discrimination (Alessandrin, 2016). In other 
words, the mismatch renders trans* people visible as trans*. 
 
 
2 This paper stems from a doctoral research project entitled ‘Discursive Practices Constructing 
Normative and trans* Sex/Gender Categories. The effects of the legal certification of sex in Belgium 
and the definition of the (gendered) worker subject’ (Aguirre-Sánchez-Beato, 2019). 
3 We use the term ‘sex’ because this is the word employed in Belgian Civil law and Belgian identity 
documents. 
4 In a few jurisdictions, a third sex (‘X’) is also allowed. 
5 In Belgium, apart from the given name, which is usually feminine or masculine, there are two types 
of sex markers in the civil status: a letter indicating the ‘sex’ and the national identity number. The 
letter indicating the sex can be either F (for ‘female’) or M (for ‘male’). The national identity number is 
gendered in the sense that uneven numbers are attributed to women, even numbers to men.  
6 Following Elliot’s (2009) suggestion, we use the term ‘trans* people’ as an ‘umbrella term’ to 
‘acknowledge the heterogeneous and non-harmonious constitution of the group’ (2009: 7). The 
different theoretical definitions of trans* people and the particular term employed respond to 
different needs and goals, as well as different ways of understanding gender variance (Aguirre-
Sánchez-Beato, 2018; Bettcher, 2014, 2015; Elliot, 2009). A theoretical discussion of terms and 
definitions is beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, the goal of this study is rather to examine 
how these and other sex- or gender-related categories (i.e. ‘intersex’) are defined by law. For this 
reason, in this paper we opt for an extensional definition that usually includes the following terms: 
‘transsexual’, ‘transgender’, ‘trans’, ‘queer’ and ‘gender non-conforming’. 
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Although the sex marker found in identity documents is not the only factor 
contributing to the ‘outing’7 of trans* people, it is a particularly important one. 
According to an EU survey (FRA, 2014), 30% of trans* respondents felt discriminated 
when they had to show their identity documents, while 87% stated that life would be 
easier if legal procedures to change sex markers in civil records were more 
accessible. However, in many national jurisdictions in Europe, such procedures are 
very complicated and harmful to human dignity (Amnesty International, 2014; 
Transgender Europe, 2017). Many states make the change contingent on the 
fulfilment of requirements which intrude on trans* people’s human rights, such as 
being diagnosed as having a mental disorder or undergoing medical procedures 
producing sterilisation (Bribosia and Rorive, 2018).  
 
This was the case in Belgium until 1 January 2018, the date on which the Act 
of 10 May 2007 on Transsexuality8 (M.B. 11 July 2007)9 ceased to have legal effect. 
This Act granted ‘transsexual people’ the right to modify the sex marker in their civil 
status through a declaration before a registrar. However, the declaration had to be 
accompanied by medical and psychiatric certificates attesting that the concerned 
person had previously fulfilled several conditions. These included psychiatric 
monitoring, hormone treatment, a ‘real-life test’10, genital surgery and sterilisation. 
 
The recently adopted Act of 25 June 2017 on the reform of regulations 
concerning transgender persons with regard to the notification of a change to the 
registration of sex in civil status records and their consequences (M.B. 10 July 2017) 
replaced that Act, amending the way sex is legally certified for ‘transgender people’11 
in Belgium. Following the principle of self-determination also recently implemented 
in other European countries12, this new Act has removed nearly all medical 
conditions13 required to modify the sex marker. However, as Cooper and Renz (2016) 
state, in most countries, this amendment is based on the legal accommodation of 
 
7 ‘To out someone’ is a commonly used expression to describe the situation in which the trans* 
characteristic of an individual is known without the concerned person’s permission, particularly 
when the individual is not ‘visibly trans*’.  
8 In Belgium, the acts are named according to their date of adoption. 
9 M.B. stands for Moniteur Belge, the official journal of Belgium issued by the Federal Department of 
Justice. The reference includes the date of the M.B. in which the act was published.  
10 This test consists of being dressed and behaving like ‘the other sex’ over a period of time. 
11 Note the change of terminology from ‘transsexual’ to ‘transgender’ between the two Acts. 
12 In chronological order: Denmark (2014), Malta (2015), Ireland (2015), Norway (2016), Belgium (2017) 
and Portugal (2018). 
13 Except for minors between 16 and 18 years old.  
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trans* populations as a disadvantaged minority, without changing the way sex is 
determined for all members of society.  
 
Based on this premise, the research question we address in this paper is: how 
is sex legally certified for different categories of people in Belgium and what are the effects 
thereof? Specifically, the paper aims at elucidating the ideological effects and 
practical implications of the legal certification of sex for different populations in 
Belgium over time. The ideological effects refer to the establishment of certain social 
norms that, in this case, constitute sex/gender categories, while civil law has practical 
implications regarding the social contexts in which the legal sex marker is used, as 
legal norms defining sex/gender categories interact with other social norms. 
 
Drawing on the theoretical perspective of discursive psychology (DP) (Section 
1), we consider sex/gender categories as something constructed in discourse – in this 
case, legislative discourse – and not as an essentialist and pre-discursive reality. 
Normative sex/gender categories are thus an effect of discourse. According to this 
theoretical framework, discursive effects are not readily available for study, though 
can be elucidated through an examination of discourse variability. To elucidate the 
effects of legislation, we first identified Belgian civil law on the legal certification of 
sex since the establishment of Belgium as a sovereign state in 1831 (Section 2.1.). We 
then applied a DP-inspired analytical device (Section 2.2.) comprising a qualitative 
content analysis and the examination of content variability. An examination of the 
contents of the acts and their variability (Section 3) allowed us to discuss the 
normative effects of this legislation and its practical implications (Section 4). We 
conclude with some recommendations.  
 
1. Discursive psychology and legislation: the construction of (normative) 
sex/gender categories 
 
This piece of research is framed within the studies of gender and discourse. While 
the multiple theoretical perspectives addressing the relationship between the two are 
heterogeneous, they share the assumption that language plays a central role in the 
social construction of gender categories. Within these perspectives, gender is 
understood as a discursive practice, performed through the repetition of meaningful 
actions (Butler, 1990; Foucault, 2015; Wittig, 1992).  




Butler (1990, 1993) shows how language performativity can be a social and 
political power device. Prima facie, the utterances ‘it’s a boy’ or ‘it’s a girl’ would 
seem only to describe a fact, though actually they also accomplish a performative 
action establishing and reproducing a social norm. In this sense, the category creates 
that to which it refers. As she states, ‘gender is not to culture as sex is to nature; 
gender is also the discursive/cultural means by which “sexed nature” or a “natural 
sex” is produced and established as “prediscursive”, prior to culture, a politically 
neutral surface on which culture acts’ (Butler, 1990: 7).  
 
In line with this thinking, we use the term ‘sex/gender categories’ to underline 
the importance of not taking the body for granted but, instead, of examining how the 
meanings assigned to it are socially constructed14. Our interest centres on the 
performance of norms constructing sex/gender categories in Belgian civil law. Legal 
discourse, as with other types of discourse, is performative and produces norms. But 
it has the particularity that it takes a sovereign form ‘whereby the speaking of 
declarations are, often literally, “acts” of law’ (Butler, 1997: 16). In our case, Belgian 
civil law establishes two mutually exclusive categories (female/woman vs 
male/man)15 compulsorily applied to the civil status of all citizens. 
 
Although Butler’s work constituted a significant turning point in our 
understanding of gender, it has also been criticised for being mostly theoretical, 
lacking an analytical programme for examining the production of gender categories 
in specific contexts (McIlvenny, 2002; McNay, 1999). In this paper, we contribute to 
filling this gap by examining how Belgian civil law constructs sex/gender categories 
and the effects of such categorisation. To do this, we draw on the theoretical and 
methodological perspective of discursive psychology (DP) and the analytical tools it 
offers.   
 
 
14 The assumption of a social construction stance does not imply that gender identities or categories 
are fictional or that there are no differences between sexed bodies. It is rather an anti-essentialist 
stance in the sense that we assume that categories do not exist ‘out there’ regardless of human 
intervention because there is no categorisation without the subjects performing the categorisation 
(Ibáñez, 1985). Even so, gender is very real in its effects, constituting categories and identities 
(Meadow, 2010; Rubin, 2003). 
15 Until now, Belgium only accepts two legal sexes (see footnote 4) but the Constitutional Court ruled 
on 19 June 2019 (no. 2019-99) that this is in breach to the right to equality and non-discrimination. 
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DP is one of the many approaches to discourse analysis, a field of study 
focused on the analysis of language in use and characterised by its interdisciplinary 
nature (Íñiguez-Rueda, 2003). It emerged within social psychology in the United 
Kingdom in the 1980s (Martínez-Guzmán, Stecher and Íñiguez-Rueda, 2016; 
Wiggins, 2017), significantly expanding the boundaries of the discipline. Its main 
contribution has been to extend the study of psychological matters – e.g. 
categorisation, persuasion, attitudes – into the areas of language and social 
interaction (Sisto Campos, 2012; Weatherall, 2012).  
 
Influenced by the ‘turn to language’ that took place in the social sciences, DP 
is based on the assumption that language does things and has functions. Wiggins 
(2017) summarises the main principles of DP as follows: 1) discourse is both 
constructed and constructive; 2) discourse is situated within a social context; and 3) 
discourse is action-oriented.  
 
The first principle assumes a social constructionist stance that considers that 
our objects of study are not independent of our representation of them (Burr, 1995). 
In this sense, discourse ‘is then argued to be one of the main ways in which the 
world is socially constructed’ (Wiggins, 2017: 9). DP analyses how notions become 
common usage over time, what counts as knowledge, truth or reality, and what 
consequences this has for different people.  
 
The second principle assumes that discourse is situated within a rhetorical or 
argumentative context. In other words, discourse constructs some versions of reality, 
while undermining others: it has an argumentative nature. This is not only an 
empirical observation, but also a methodological principle (Edwards, 2003). It is 
therefore important to examine not only what is being supported, but also what is 
being explicitly or implicitly rejected (Billig, 1991). In this sense, the absence of debate 
is indicative of a common adherence to a particular stance, thereby revealing where 
the norm is. From a DP point of view, the norm does not precede the action, but it is 
embedded in it: norms are to be found within the social practices themselves and 
social practices are constitutive of norms. This includes discursive practices.   
 
The third principle assumes that if discourse constructs different versions of 
events and is situated in specific contexts, it will accomplish functions and effects by 
acting within and on the context. DP thus focuses on actions carried out through 
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discourse, i.e. taking an anti-representational stance towards language: language 
does not (only) represent but is also performative. In other words, it performs 
actions. This stance on language is a common denominator between Butler’s work 
on performativity and DP’s focus on action (Martínez-Guzmán and Iñiguez-Rueda, 
2010). In this sense, discourse performs ideological functions: it can promote and 
maintain, but also challenge, certain social relations. As Íñiguez-Rueda and Antaki 
(1994) explain, the analysis consists of ‘revealing the power of language as a 
constitutive and regulatory practice’ (1994: 63). 
 
However, the functions or effects are not in general directly available for study 
in a straightforward way in the sense that they are not always explicitly uttered 
(Wetherell and Potter, 1988). For instance, an apology can be made without people 
necessarily saying that they are sorry or that they apologise, i.e. an apology may be 
the effect of discourse, not its content. In a similar vein, civil law constitutes 
normative sex/gender categories without explicitly mentioning that it is doing so.  
 
It is nevertheless possible to shed light on the functions or effects through 
analysing the variability of discourse. Variability is inevitable due to the dilemmatic 
nature of common usage, which determines the argumentative feature of discourse. 
People use language to construct different versions of reality, with their accounts 
showing significant variation depending on the aim pursued. People’s accounts, 
descriptions and explanations vary according to the stance that they take in 
controversies. The effects are thus the results of analysis rather than raw data. In this 
paper, we elucidate the normative effects of Belgian civil law regulating the 
certification of sex via an analysis of its variability16.  
 
2. Method and procedure 
 
2.1 Identification and selection of the legislative corpus  
 
16 Variability in discourse is articulated through particular uses of discursive or rhetorical devices, 
defined as ‘techniques for the construction of facts’ (Edwards and Potter, 1992). However, this does 
not imply that there is no regularity in discourse. As Potter and Wetherell (1988) explain, there is 
regularity in variability. It does imply, however, that the individual (and its assumed consistency) is 
abandoned as the unit of analysis. The unit of analysis is the particular use of discursive or rhetorical 
devices. The appreciation of variability in the content of the corpus (assessed through the presence or 
absence of specific elements) allowed us to elucidate the effects of the legislation as a whole.  




To elucidate the ideological and practical effects of the legal certification of sex for 
different populations in Belgium over time, we identified all corresponding Belgian 
legal provisions, as well as documents related to their associated parliamentary 
work. First established in a person’s birth certificate, the sex marker is part of a 
Belgian’s civil status, a federal matter governed by the Civil Code. Dating back to 
1804, the current Belgian Civil Code is based on the French ‘Napoleonic Code’. 
Although the Code has been adapted over time, the legal basis remains the same. 
The declaration of birth and the birth certificate are handled in Book I (of persons), 
Title II (of records of civil status), Chapter II (of records of birth), Articles 55-62 of the 
Civil Code. Different acts have amended these provisions, while various Ministerial 
Circulars (hereafter: Circulars) have guided their interpretation. 
 
Starting with the latest version of the Civil Code available in January 201817 
(version 7718), we identified the Acts which have amended and/or added an extra 
article to the original Book I, Title II, Chapter II directly or indirectly concerning the 
sex marker in the civil status. Since many Acts published before 1997 are not 
available online, we consulted the paper versions of the Moniteur Belge in the 
Université libre de Bruxelles law library. We then read through these Acts, checking 
whether they themselves replaced others that had previously amended that chapter 
with regard to the sex marker. This procedure allowed us to reproduce all sex-
related amendments to this chapter. We did not include those introducing an 
amendment not directly concerned with the sex marker. The final list of Acts 
included in the corpus is presented in Table 1, together with the short name assigned 









17 Date on which the Legal Gender Recognition Act entered into force.  
18 This version was in force until 1 March 2018. There have been no further amendments of Articles 
55, 56 and 57 as of the date of the first submission of the paper (August 2019).  
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Table 1. Code and acts included in the corpus 
Full name Short name  
(1) Civil Code. Book I (of people), Title II (of records 
of civil status), Chapter II (of records of birth)   
Napoleonic Code 
(2) Act of 23 November 1961 amending Article 55 of 
the Civil Code (M.B. 16 January 1962) 
Act amending Article 55 
(3) Act of 30 March 1984 modifying the articles 55, 
56 and 57 of the Civil Code and article 361 of the 
Penal Code (M.B. 22 December 1984) 
Act amending Articles 55, 56 
and 57 
(4) Act of 10 May 2007 on Transsexuality (M.B. 11 
July 2007) 
Transsexuality Act  
(5) Act of 15 May 2007 modifying article 57 of the 
Civil Code with regard to the notification of the 
sex of a child suffering from sexual ambiguity 
(M.B. 12 July 2007) 
Act on Sexual Ambiguity 
(6) Act of 14 January 2013 including several 
provisions concerning the reduction of workload 
within the judicial system (M.B. 1 March 2013) 
Act Reducing the Judicial 
Workload 
(7) Act of 25 June 2017 on the reform of regulations 
concerning transgender persons with regard to 
the notification of a change to the registration of 
sex in civil status records and their consequences 
(M.B. 10 July 2017) 
Legal Gender Recognition 
Act  
 
Having identified the Acts, we looked for the associated parliamentary work on the 
Chamber of Representatives’ website (bills, parliamentary debates, hearings and 
amendments). Given that both the French and Dutch versions of the documents are 
official, only the French version was sought and included in the corpus. We 
downloaded and read all the documents, selecting the ones directly or indirectly 
related to the registration and/or modification of the sex marker in the civil status. 
We also selected the sections within each document concerning issues of interest, 
excluding documents and/or sections of documents addressing other issues, such as 
amendments to the Judicial Code, questions related to names and surnames or 
sections merely dealing with administrative matters. In total, 48 documents 
constituted the final corpus (see the Annex for the complete list).  
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2.2 Analytical device: qualitative content analysis and examination of content variability 
 
The discourse analysis method proposed by DP entails a very detailed and 
exhaustive examination of linguistic forms and variations in their use, i.e. the very 
specific way in which language is employed. However, it is difficult to perform such 
a detailed analysis on a very large corpus of data. Taking into account the size of our 
corpus, we developed a DP-inspired analytical device that allowed us to describe 
efficiently how Belgian legislation has certified the sex marker for different 
categories of people over time and the effects of that legislation. The analytical 
device comprises two phases: a qualitative content analysis and the consequent 
examination of content variability.  
 
Content analysis is a method describing the content of texts and talk. 
Applicable to any type of data record, it is a text interpretation technique using 
codes as the fundamental element to describe the characteristics of the data content 
(Andréu Abela, 2000). It aims not only to systematise and explain the content of texts 
with the help of qualitative or quantitative hints, but also to make inferences. One of 
the advantages of this method is that it is not dependent on any specific theory and 
epistemology (Braun and Clarke, 2006), making it applicable across a variety of 
theoretical perspectives. This feature makes content analysis compatible with the 
discursive perspective adopted in our study.  
 
Content analysis can be quantitative or qualitative. The former examines the 
frequency of occurrence of determined codes within a corpus, whereas the latter 
describes their qualitative content. In the same vein, it can follow an inductive or a 
deductive procedure. In the first case, the categories emerge from the corpus, 
whereas in the second case they are theoretically driven. Our content analysis was 
qualitative and deductive: we applied a series of pre-established codes to each Act in 
order to identify its qualitative content. The analytical codes were established based 
on the DP perspective towards gender categories and norms described above. Table 
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Table 1. Codes used in the content analysis 
Code Definition of the code Underlying theoretical 
assumption 
Date of adoption 
Date on which the Act was 
adopted. 
The presence or absence of 
legislation on a specific matter 
over time is indicative of the 
evolution of the argumentative 
context: what is taken for granted 
(norms or conventions) and/or the 
emergence of new social norms. 
Type of legal 
matter 
Specific matter addressed by 
the Act: 1) registration of the 
sex at birth or 2) its 
subsequent modification. 
The category creates what it refers 
to: the term employed to define 
the legal subject, the type of legal 
matter addressed, the purposes of 
the Act, the changes incorporated 
and the criteria used to define sex 




Individual(s) concerned by 
the Act: term(s) employed. 
Purposes 
What is to be officially 
achieved by means of the Act. 
Changes 
Changes incorporated in the 
Act. 
Sex criteria  
Criteria used to certify the sex 
of an individual in the Act.  
Stakeholders 
consulted 
Number and type of 
individuals (experts, civil 
society, professionals, 
governmental bodies, etc.) 
consulted during the drafting 
of the Act. 
It is indicative of the degree of 
controversy on a specific matter 
since we do not discuss about 
what is taken for granted. The 
type of individuals consulted also 
indicates how the matter is 
framed and who is considered to 
be an expert in that regard. 
Intertextuality 
Relationship between the 
Acts: whether an Act amends 
and/or is amended by the 
others. 
Discourse is always situated 
within an argumentative context.  
Current state of Whether the Act is in force or Taking into account the different 
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the act has been replaced by another 
Act. 
Acts in place nowadays, the 
legislation as a whole can be said 
to function as a macro speech act 
(Van Dijk, 2005), establishing both 
the norm and the exception(s) to 
that norm. 
 
The results of the content analysis are presented in Table 2. After identifying 
and systematising the content of the Acts, we then examined the variability of their 
content in order to elucidate the effects of the legislation. As explained above, the 
effects performed by discourse are not necessarily explicitly uttered and, thus, not 
directly available for study. By comparing the Acts, we were able not only to identify 
the different legal constructions of sex over time, but also to elucidate the ideological 
effects of the current legislation.  
 
3. Results  
 
3.1. Description of the content of the acts 
 
(1) Napoleonic Code  
 
Since adoption of the Belgian Civil Code, articles 55-62 of Book I, Title II, Chapter II 
have addressed the question of declaring and recording birth, inter alia regulating 
the civil status of all new-borns. The information that the birth certificate must 
contain, including the child’s sex, is listed in Article 57. The other articles concern 
related issues: where, when and how the birth is to be declared (Article 55), by 
whom (Article 56), the procedure that must be followed when a new-born is found 
(Article 58), the procedure when a child is born on a boat (Article 59-61) and the act 
of recognition of the child19 (Article 62). Therefore, the most relevant articles for 
understanding the registration of sex are Articles 55, 56 and especially 57. It is 
important to note that all these articles were subsequently amended. The qualitative 
content analysis carried out here examines the first version of the Civil Code 
(Napoleonic Code). 
 
19 Act by which someone certifies that a maternity or paternity bond exists between her or him and 
the child.  




The original Asrticle 55 stated that the birth had to be declared within three 
days following delivery and that the new-born had to be presented before the 
registrar. Article 56 stated that the birth of the child had to be declared by the father 
and, in the absence of the father, by a doctor, midwife or any other health 
professional who assisted at the birth.  
Article 57 provided that the birth certificate had to contain:  
‘… the day, time and place of birth, the sex of the child,20 and the name given to 
him or her, the names, surnames, profession and address of the father and the 
mother, and those of the witnesses’21 (Civil Code, 1804, p. 15). 
As we can see, the Civil Code does not mention the criteria upon which the 
registration of the child’s sex marker was determined, who determined it or which 
possible sexes could be registered. The same is true for the preparatory work of the 
Code. 
The Napoleonic Code was drafted by a commission of jurists under the rule of 
Napoleon. Records of the preparatory work done by the French Council of State 
show that the definition of sex was not specifically debated during drafting. 
However, the use of utterances expressing contrasting sexes, such as ‘one or the 
other sex’ and ‘the weaker sex’ (referring to women) as opposed to ‘the stronger sex’ 
(referring to men), indicates a binary classification of sex expressed through the 
categories ‘woman’ and ‘man’. The binary contrast was undoubtedly present in 
legislation at the time.  
 
(2) Act amending Article 55  
 
This Act, adopted on 23 November 1961, aimed to extend the deadline for declaring 
a birth. It applied to all citizens. The three days established by the Napoleonic Code 
was deemed too short, especially when the birth took place before a public holiday. 
The Act established that Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays were not to be 
included in the 3-day deadline. No expert or external body was consulted. 
 
 
20 Emphasis added. 
21 All the legislative excerpts presented in the paper were translated from French into English by the 
authors. 
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Although this Act did not explicitly address the registration of sex, it was the 
first time the role of the doctor in registering the birth is mentioned. During 
parliamentary work, the possibility not to present the child before the registrar was 
debated (Doc. Ch. 38 130/002). According to a member of the Chamber, the practice 
of presenting the new-born was practically abandoned, being replaced by a medical 
certificate verifying ‘the fact of birth and the sex’ (p. 2). However, it was argued that 
the registrar had the right to see the child anyway and the obligation to present the 
new-born at the civil registry was not removed from the law.  
 
It is worth noting that, although the medical certification of sex was already 
common social practice, no mention was made of the criteria to be used in 
determining the child’s sex. 
 
(3) Act amending Articles 55, 56 and 57 
 
This Act, adopted on 30 March 1984, amended Articles 55, 56 and 57 of the Civil 
Code. Its main purpose was to allow the mother to declare the birth and to remove 
the formal obligation to present the child to the registrar. The Act applies to all 
citizens. The permanent commission on civil status was consulted.  
 
Based on the principle of gender equality, this Act for the first time allowed 
the mother to declare the birth of her child. As a consequence, the declaration 
deadline was extended to 15 days to allow the mother to recover from the delivery. 
At the same time, the doctor, midwife or any other person assisting at the birth had 
to inform the registrar of the birth on the first working day thereafter.  
 
Similarly, the child no longer had to be presented, as this provision was in 
practice outdated (Doc. Ch. 44 400/001). It was officially replaced by a medical 
certificate attesting the birth signed by a doctor or a midwife. Where this was not 
possible, the registrar could still go personally to see the new-born.   
 
Other legislative amendments concerned the information to be included in 
the birth certificate. The obligation to register the name of the witnesses and the 
professions of the parents was removed. The sex marker was still required, without 
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any discussion on whether to remove it. The criteria governing certification of the 
sex were neither mentioned nor discussed.  
 
(4) Transsexuality Act  
 
Adopted on 10 May 2007, the Transsexuality Act was the first act allowing 
modification of the sex marker in the civil status in Belgium. Before that, trans* 
people had no other choice than to go to court. However, due to the lack of legal 
clarity, there was a large discrepancy in court decisions. When modification of the 
birth certificate was allowed, it was based on a rectification procedure which implied 
that a mistake had been made on assigning sex at birth which needed to be 
retroactively corrected. 
 
Contrary to the previous Acts, the Bill was much debated, with other bodies, 
experts and civil society groups being consulted. Opinions were asked from the 
bioethics advisory committee, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, 
the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finances, and the Minister of Social 
Affairs and Public Health. There were also hearings with several experts including a 
psychiatrist from a hospital’s ‘gender team’,22 a surgeon, a lecturer in law, and a 
professor emeritus in family law. Representatives of three trans* groups were also 
heard. The legislation section of the Council of State also gave its opinion (part of the 
legislative process in Belgium). 
 
The Transsexuality Act only applied to ‘transsexual’ individuals. 
‘Transsexual’ and ‘transsexuality’ were the terms used therein. Its purpose was to 
avoid legal uncertainty for transsexual people by establishing an administrative 
procedure for recognising their prior ‘sex change’ or ‘sexual reassignment’ (Doc. Ch. 
51 0903/001). It added two Articles (62bis and 62ter) to the Civil Code.23  
 
 
22 A multidisciplinary team (psychiatrists, psychologists-sexologists, paediatricians, speech therapists, 
endocrinologists, urologists, plastic surgeons) specialised in ‘gender transitions’. 
23 This Act also regulated other issues such as the modification of the given name(s) (modifying other 
Acts, such as the Act of 15 May 1987 concerning surnames and names). However, those changes are 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Article 62bis established the rules for transsexual individuals to modify the 
sex marker in their birth certificates. The person concerned had to declare before the 
registrar that he or she had the ‘intimate, constant and irreversible conviction that he 
or she belongs to the sex opposite to the one indicated in the birth certificate and that 
his or her body has been adapted to that sex to the greatest extent feasible and 
medically justified’ (M.B. 11 July 2007, p. 37823). Drawing on the medical discourse, 
the conviction that they ‘belong to the other sex’ was defined in this Act as a mental 
disorder (‘gender identity trouble’ or ‘gender dysphoria’). This declaration had to be 
accompanied by a declaration from a psychiatrist and a surgeon attesting that: 
‘1. the concerned person has the intimate, constant and irreversible conviction 
that he or she belongs to the sex opposite to the one indicated on the birth 
certificate; 2. the concerned person underwent sexual reassignment matching 
the opposite sex to the greatest extent feasible and medically justified; 3. the 
concerned person can no longer conceive children in accordance with his or her 
previous sex’ (M.B. 11 July 2007: 37823–37824). 
Following the adoption of the Transsexuality Act, only transsexual people had the 
right to modify the sex marker in their civil status, and only after fulfilling certain 
strict conditions: undergoing a psychiatric assessment, hormonal treatment, genital 
surgery and sterilisation.24 These conditions establish the binary opposition between 
the categories ‘woman’ and ‘man’. The boundary between them reflects the 
conviction of belonging to a sex (the opposite), but especially the possession of 
certain sexual characteristics of that sex (namely, secondary sexual characteristics, 
genitalia and gonads). It is the first time that the criteria upon which the registration 
of the sex marker is made are explicitly mentioned in law and were discussed in 
Parliament. And they are directly linked to sexual dimorphism.  
 
(5) Act on Sexual Ambiguity 
 
Adopted on 15 May 2007, this Act extended the deadline for registering a child’s sex 
from 15 days to three months in cases of intersexuality, thereby amending Article 57 
 
24 As explained above, the Act was conceived to legally recognise the ‘sexual reassignment’ of an 
individual (taking for granted that all ‘transsexual people’ undergo one). Therefore, it was assumed 
that the person concerned was already sterile: it was presented as a ‘purely medical fact’. However, 
on one occasion (see Doc. Ch. 51 0903/006: 58–59), sterilisation was described by the legislator as an 
ethical question, thereby defining what is ‘natural’ and ‘acceptable’ for women and men in terms of 
reproduction .  
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of the Civil Code (previously amended by the Act amending Articles 55, 56 and 57). 
It is still in force. 
 
The Act regulates the recording of a child’s sex in the birth certificate for 
children “suffering from sexual ambiguity’. This term is used to denote children who 
‘are born with an anomaly that can be classified within the intersexuality field’ (Doc. 
Ch. 51 1242/001 2004: 3). The 15-day time limit was denounced as being too short in 
the case of children ‘suffering from sexual ambiguity’ because additional medical 
exams were needed to determine their sex.  
 
In one parliamentary debate, a deputy stated that in the birth certificate ‘the 
sex can only be either masculine or feminine’ (Doc. Ch. 51 1242/005 2004: 9). 
Regarding intersex children, the customary practice until then was that a sex was 
randomly chosen by the parents of the child at the time of declaring the birth. The 
sex marker could be changed at a later date via a rectification procedure.25 Instead of 
extending the deadline for declaring the child’s birth, this Act solely allows parents 
to delay registering the child’s sex, i.e. the birth of the child must still be declared 
within the 15 days following birth. This is why the modification introduced by this 
Act related to Article 57 of the Civil Code (defining the information to be registered 
in the birth certificate) and not Article 55 (establishing when a birth has to be 
declared). 
 
On the basis of a medical certificate attesting a child’s intersexuality, parents 
have up to three months to register its sex. According to the medical experts 
consulted, three months is the time required to obtain the results of the karyotype26 
test. Karyotyping is thus the criterion for determining a child’s sex. However, certain 
MPs feared a spread of the use of this test, insisting that  
‘in normal cases, sex determination is based solely on the externally visible 
morphological sexual characteristics. Accordingly, it would be useful not to 
mention in the law any detailed reference to medical indications and their 
content in order to ensure that a thorough medical examination is only possible 
in the event of any uncertainty surrounding the sex and that the traditional 
examination remains the rule for all other cases’ (Doc. Ch. 51 1242/005 2004: 8).  
 
25 Art. 1383 to 1385 of the Judicial Code. 
26 Number and appearance of chromosomes in the nucleus of a eukaryotic cell. 
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In other words, karyotyping is only to be carried out in ‘cases of doubt’ regarding a 
child’s sex according to sexual dimorphism. In ‘normal’ cases, sexual dimorphism is 
enough to determine its sex.  
 
(6) Act Reducing the Judicial Workload 
 
This Act was adopted on 14 January 2013 to reduce the Ministry of Justice’s 
workload. It thus covers a broad range of issues unrelated to the topic of this paper. 
Taking it into account in our corpus is justified to the extent that it removed the 
possibility for a registrar to visit a new-born child (amending Article 56 of the Civil 
Code, previously amended by the Act amending Articles 55, 56 and 57). Therefore, 
the medical certificate becomes the only certification of sex for all citizens. Neither 
the criteria upon which the registration of a child’s sex is determined nor the content 
of the medical certificate are mentioned in the Act, nor were they discussed in 
Parliament. 
 
(7)  Legal Gender Recognition Act 
 
This Act was adopted on 25 June 2017. As was the case of the parliamentary work on 
the Transsexuality Act, many stakeholders were again heard, though this time other 
ones. They were mainly trans* and LGBT associations from all over the country, as 
well as the Federal Gender Equality Body and an Equality Law Clinic. No surgeon 
was consulted this time, though a child psychiatrist was heard. The legislative 
section of the Council of State was also consulted.  
 
This Act came into force on 1 January 2018, entirely replacing the 2007 
Transsexuality Act. Particularly, it amended Civil Code Articles 62bis and 62ter 
(introduced by the Transsexuality Act) and added a new Article 62bis/1. The Act 
applies to ‘transgender’ persons, with the term ‘transsexual’ practically absent. Its 
purpose was to comply with international human rights standards concerning 
transgender people and to facilitate a change of the sex marker (Doc. Ch. 54 
2403/001). At international and European level, human rights players and 
institutions were clamouring for national states to end discrimination against trans* 
people, including State measures such as forced sterilisation and the psychiatrisation 
of trans* identities.  




Based on the principle of self-determination, this Act removes the medical 
conditions set by the Transsexuality Act needing to be fulfilled to have the sex 
marker changed, replacing them by two declarations of the person concerned before 
the registrar, with a 3-6-month period of reflection between the two. In the 
declarations, the person concerned must state that he or she has ‘the conviction that 
the sex stated in his or her birth certificate does not match his or her intimately 
experienced gender identity’ (M.B. 10 July 2017: 71465). The criterion upon which the 
sex marker is determined is thus defined as the ‘intimately experienced gender 
identity’. The Act however maintained the requirement for a child psychiatrist to 
issue a declaration for unemancipated minors older than 16.27 In this declaration, the 
psychiatrist must attest that the minor has the capacity of discernment. Whatever the 
case, the sex marker in the civil status may only be changed once,28 i.e. the Act 
maintains the irrevocability of the procedure and the permanent character of the 
binary opposition between women and men.  
 
Following an appeal filed by several LGBT associations,29 the Constitutional 
Court overruled the irrevocable nature of a change of the registered sex as stated in 
Article 62bis of the Civil Code on 19 June 2019. The Court based its ruling on the 
constitutional principle of equality and non-discrimination construed in light of the 
right to privacy which enshrined the right to self-determination. In this respect, 
individuals with a fluid gender identity were taken into special consideration 
(Ruling no. 99/2019, B.8.8.). Moreover, the Court ruled that there was a gap in the 
law: the legislator had only considered the situation of individuals with a binary 
gender identity, overlooking the situation of individuals with a non-binary identity 
who were still forced to accept a sex marker out of line with their gender identity. As 
a result of this ruling, the legislator has to fill this gap, choosing between various 
possibilities, including adding further categories to the “F” and “M” ones or 
removing altogether the sex marker in the civil status (Ruling no. 09/2019, B.7.3.). 
 
This ruling is shaking the very foundations of the binary representation of the 
sex marker. It is too early to say which path the legislator will choose (at a time 
 
27 Minors younger than 16 cannot have their sex marker changed. 
28 Exceptionally, it can be changed a second time following a judicial procedure. In such a case, the 
person concerned must prove that the initial change caused problems, for instance, discrimination. 
29 Çavaria, Maison Arc-en-Ciel and Genres Pluriels. 
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where Belgium is without a federal government). Therefore, it was impossible to 
include the latest developments in our study.   
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Act amending Articles 
55, 56 and 57 (3) 
Transsexuality Act  
(4) 
Act on Sexual 
Ambiguity (5) 




Recognition Act  
(7) 
Date of adoption 21 March 1804 23 November 1961 30 March 1984 10 May 2007 15 May 2007 14 January 2013 25 June 2017 
Type of legal matter  
Registration of sex 
at birth 
Registration of sex 
at birth 
Registration of sex at 
birth 
Subsequent modification 
of the registration of sex 
Registration of sex at 
birth 
Registration of sex at 
birth 
Subsequent modification 
of the registration of sex 
Legal subject All citizens All citizens All citizens A transsexual person 
A child suffering from 
sexual ambiguity 
All citizens A transgender person 
Purposes 
To regulate the civil 
status of individuals 
To extend the 
deadline for 
declaring a child’s 
birth (3 days until 
then) 
To allow the mother to 
declare the birth & to 
eliminate obligation to 
present the child to the 
registrar 
To introduce an 
administrative procedure 
before the registrar to 
recognise sex change 
To extend the deadline 
for declaring the sex of 
a child suffering from 
sexual ambiguity 
To reduce the workload 
within the judicial 
system  
To comply with 
international human right 
standards & to facilitate a 
change of the sex marker 
Changes  
Art. 55: birth to be 
declared within the 
3 days following the 
delivery & new-
born to be presented 
before the registrar; 
Art. 56: birth of the 
child to be declared 
by the father (in his 
absence, by a 
doctor, midwife or 
any other health 
professional who 
assisted at the 
birth); Art. 57: birth 
declaration to 
include the sex of 
the child 
Saturdays, Sundays 
and public holidays 
not included in 3-
day deadline 
Mother allowed to 
declare birth; deadline 
extended to 15 days; 
introduction of medical 
certificate 
It sets the conditions for 
transsexual people to have 





It extends the deadline 
to declare the sex of a 
child ‘suffering from 
sexual ambiguity’ (up to 
3 months) 
It removes the 
possibility for the 
registrar to visit the 
new-born. Medical 
certificate is the only 
certification of sex 
It removes the medical 
conditions set by (4) to 
modify the mention of sex 
in the civil status. 
Drawing on the principle 
of self-determination, it 
establishes 2 declarations 
before the registrar, with a 
period of reflection (3 to 6 
months) between them. 
For an unemancipated 
minor older than 16, a 
certificate from a child 
psychiatrist is required 









certification of the 
sex of the child is a 
customary practice 
Criteria neither 
mentioned nor debated. 
Medical certificate now 
established by law, but 
registrar can still visit 
the child 
Intimate conviction of 
belonging to a sex (‘the 
opposite’) & possession 
of certain sexual 
characteristics of that sex 
(genitalia, gonads, 
hormones & secondary 
sexual characteristics). 
 








mentioned nor debated. 
Medical certificate is 
enough, registrar cannot 
visit the child 
Gender identity intimately 
experienced (alleged self-
determination) 
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of civil status 
- Bio-ethical committee 
- Deputy Prime Minister 
& Minister of the Interior 
- Deputy Prime Minister 
& Minister of Finances 
- Minister of Social 
Affairs & Public Health 
- Psychiatrist (Ghent 
hospital) 
- Surgeon (Ghent 
hospital) 
- Lecturer in law (KU 
Leuven) 
- Professor emeritus in 
law (Université de Liège) 
- Council of State 





consulted before the 
drafting of the bill (no 
hearings during 
parliamentary work) 





- Council of State 
- Arc-en-ciel Wallonie 
- Çavaria 
- Rainbowhouse Brussels 
- Child psychiatrist 
(Kindergenderteam, 
Ghent Hospital) 
- Equality Law Clinic 
(ULB) 
- Genres pluriels 
- Institut pour l'égalité des 
femmes et des hommes 
Intertextuality 
Amended by (2), 
(3), (4), (5), (6) & 
(7) 
It amends Art. 55 of 
(1) 
It amends Art. 55, 56 & 
57 of (1) 
It adds two Articles (62bis 
& 62ter) in (1) 
It amends Art. 57 of (1) 
It amends Art. 56 of (1) 
[previously amended by 
(3)] 
It amends Art. 62bis of 
(1) [inserted by (4)], it 
adds an Art. 62bis/1 in (1) 
& replaces Art. 62ter of 
(1) [inserted by (4)] 
Current state In force Replaced by (3) In force Replaced by (7) In force In force In force 
 
 
30 None of these groups seems to exist nowadays.  
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3.2 Review of content variability  
 
In Belgium, the sex marker has been included in the civil status of individuals since 
the adoption of the Civil Code (Napoleonic Code). However, it was not until 2007 
that an Act allowing its change was adopted for the first time (Transsexuality Act). 
Most of the legislation (five Acts) regulates the registration of sex at birth, with only 
two Acts addressing its subsequent modification.  
 
The purposes and matters addressed in the legislation regulating the 
registration of sex at birth relate to the conditions surrounding the declaration of 
birth (by when the declaration has to be done and by whom). These Acts reveal a 
progressive move towards legal reliance on the medical determination of a child’s 
sex, substituting the presentation of the child before the registrar by a medical 
certificate. Legal reliance on medical criteria is such that the specific criteria are 
never actually described in these Acts. This absence of legal interference in the 
medical domain assigns to medicine and medical experts the ‘truth’ of sex. The only 
time criteria were mentioned was during the parliamentary work on the Act on 
Sexual Ambiguity, when the medical procedure to determine a child’s sex was 
described. This distinguished between the procedure under ‘normal circumstances’ 
(i.e. sexual dimorphism) and that ‘in cases of intersexuality’ (i.e. no sexual 
dimorphism). In ‘abnormal’ cases, the legal definition of sex is based on 
chromosomes. The legal subject of these Acts is always ‘all citizens’ without 
specification, except for the ‘abnormal’ cases where the legal subject is ‘the child 
suffering from sexual ambiguity’.  
 
The absence of legal interference in the initial determination of the sex marker 
is in clear contrast with the law’s involvement in its modification. The criteria 
allowing for such are explicitly regulated by the Transsexuality Act and Legal 
Gender Recognition Act. The legal subject is not ‘all citizens’ but the ‘transsexual 
individual’ in the first case and the ‘transgender person’ in the second. The 
Transsexuality Act set forth several medical conditions to be fulfilled: the 
‘transsexual’ individual had to provide medical certificates attesting that she or he 
had the ‘intimate conviction of belonging to the other sex’, had undergone sexual 
reassignment, and had been sterilised. In other words, it established a ‘mismatch’ 
between a person’s identity and body and allowed a change of the sex marker based 
on identity and sexual dimorphism. The Legal Gender Recognition Act removed 
almost all medical criteria, establishing a person’s gender identity as the only 
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criterion to be met to change the sex marker. Therefore, sexual dimorphism no 
longer determines the sex marker of transgender people. However, gender identity 
is only established as a criterion for transgender people.  
 
The norm that humankind is naturally divided into two categories is taken for 
granted, with the legislation only specifying the norms constituting the binary 
opposition between women and men for people outside these categories. This 
contrast also becomes evident in the fact that no experts, legal bodies or civil society 
were consulted in the drafting of the acts regulating the registration of sex at birth. 
Nevertheless, many stakeholders were invited to hearings and/or to provide their 
written opinions on the matter. 
 
4. Discussion: ideological effects and practical implications 
 
The variability present in the legislation regulating the sex marker in the civil status 
has both ideological and practical effects. At the ideological level, the identified 
variability reproduces and institutionalises cisnormativity, establishing women and 
men as natural categories and a correspondence between the characteristics of the 
so-called biological sex and gender identity. Although the recent Legal Gender 
Recognition Act constitutes a shift, it is an exception to the rule when the whole 
legislative framework on this topic is taken into account.  
 
The analysis of the variability across Acts helps us understand how 
cisnormativity is produced. First, the legislation distinguishes between Acts 
targeting the population at large and those targeting specific ‘outside the norm’ 
populations. The legal subject of the former is an ‘unmarked’ subject (‘the person’, 
‘the child’), whereas the legal subject of the latter is a ‘marked’ subject (‘the 
transsexual’, ‘the transgender person’, ‘the child suffering from sexual ambiguity’).  
 
Second, the initial certification of a child’s sex is not directly regulated by any 
Act, but has over time become increasingly delegated to medical judgment. 
However, changing the sex marker in adulthood is explicitly regulated and very 
much debated. It is noteworthy that not a single expert was consulted during the 
parliamentary work on the Acts regulating the certification of sex at birth, whereas 
many were consulted during the parliamentary debates on changing the sex marker 
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later in life. Indeed, the only case in which the initial assignment is mentioned 
regards the registration of the sex of an intersex child, being called ‘an exception’.  
 
Third, the medical criteria determining sex at birth are only mentioned for 
children whose body does not fit in with sexual dimorphism – namely, intersex 
children. In the act regulating such cases, the criteria determining sex in both 
‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ cases are explicitly described. Thus, ‘normal sex’ is defined 
as visible genitalia that fall under sexual dimorphism. In the case of bodies outside 
the sexual dimorphism norm, sex is exceptionally determined on the basis of 
chromosomes, deemed to possess the ultimate ‘truth’ about sex.     
 
Fourth, notions related to identity (‘intimate, constant and irreversible 
conviction that he or she belongs to the opposite sex’, ‘intimately experienced gender 
identity’) are employed as criteria only in the acts targeting trans* people. In other 
words, the mind-body dichotomy is only applied to trans* people. Whereas the 
certification of sex at birth has been increasingly medicalised, changing the sex 
marker has been psychologised. Gender identity seems not to be an issue for the rest 
of society. Just as only homosexual people seem to have a sexual orientation, only 
trans* people seem to have a gender identity. It is thus just assumed that the norm is 
to identify oneself with the sex attributed at birth.   
 
This variability across Acts has a twofold effect. On the one hand, it reifies 
sexual dimorphism as if human bodies were naturally classified into two classes, 
erasing intersex realities. The process through which the classification is produced is 
silenced. Genitalia are never mentioned except for in relation to intersex and 
transsexual people. On the other hand, the correspondence between ‘biological sex’ 
and gender identity is naturalised and rendered invisible as a universal norm 
instead of presenting it as one possibility among others. Cisnormativity is an 
instituted mechanism that not only polices and punishes people who move away 
from gender norms, but also functions as a prescriptive and regulatory model for all 
(Martínez-Guzmán, 2017).  
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Looking at the Acts currently in force31 at a practical level, the sex marker is 
not unambiguous, being based on different criteria for different subjects. Whereas 
for some trans* people32 the sex marker only reflects the identity in binary terms, for 
intersex people it is indicative of the chromosomes while for the rest of the 
population it reflects their visible genitalia. Taking into account the performative 
power of law (Butler, 1997), the different legal constructions of sex can have major 
practical implications in situations where sex is assumed to have a single meaning (a 
binary and cisnormative interpretation of the legal mention of sex). For instance, in 
the health sphere, trans* men who changed their sex marker after 1 January 2018 (the 
date the Legal Gender Recognition Act entered into force) may be overlooked in 
cervical cancer screening campaigns if the sex marker is taken to mean ‘genitalia’. In 
this case, trans* men have an M for male in their civil status, but have not necessarily 
undergone surgery and thus have a uterus. This is just one example among many.  
 
A much debated and controversial domain is that of segregated statistical 
data based on the registered sex marker. Advocates of sex-segregated data claim 
their usefulness to measure and prove gender inequality and discrimination against 
women. The interest of such data is not to analyse biological differences, but social 
differences between the categories ‘woman’ and ‘man’. And yet, strictly speaking, 
this data informs us mainly about the type of genitalia at birth.33 In practice, we 
cannot know whether people self-identify, express themselves and/or are perceived 
and treated according to their legal sex. Therefore, sex-segregated data can be useful 
when used as a heuristic, but does not allow us to understand what is specifically at 
stake. The usefulness of such data lies in the assumption that an individual who was 
assigned the female sex at birth will self-identify and be identified by others as a 
woman and will ‘behave’ and be treated as such. In other words, it relies on and 
reproduces cisnormativity. Yet such data is considered a key tool for enforcing 
gender equality. 
 
The ruling of the Constitutional Court offers an opportunity to ask ourselves 
whether and for what purposes the legal registration of sex is needed and to 
reconsider how it is certified for all citizens, not only for trans* people. Various 
creative solutions are available, such as establishing different markers according to 
 
31 Civil Code, Act amending Articles 55, 56 and 57, Transsexuality Act, Act on Sexual Ambiguity, Act 
Reducing the Judicial Workload and the Legal Gender Recognition Act. 
32 Those who changed their registered sex marker under the Legal Gender Recognition Act. 
33 Most of the population do not change their sex marker. In Belgium, 1625 people changed it between 
January 1993 and September 2018 (Institut pour l’égalité des femmes et des hommes, 2018).   
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what specific aspect we are referring to (e.g. physical characteristics, identity, 
expression), establishing non-binary markers, allowing multiple changes of markers, 
making the markers not available to the public but viewable only for specific 
purposes (e.g. health campaigns, gender quotas) or abolishing the registration of 




In view of the ideological effects and practical implications described above, we 
consider that future legislative solutions should pay attention to two main issues. On 
the one hand, they should avoid creating a distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘out of 
the norm/exceptional’ legal subjects which, in turn, reproduces ‘women’ and ‘men’ 
as two natural and essential categories. They should thus take greater account of 
human diversity in relation to sexed bodies and ways of experiencing gender 
beyond the binary opposition between the categories ‘woman’ and ‘man’. On the 
other, future solutions should also help promote inclusion and tackle discrimination. 
This entails understanding what is at stake when we address specific sex/gender 
issues built on a distinction between women and men. In other words, the legal 
certification of sex should be rethought with a view to addressing inequalities 
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